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Abstract
Recent technological developments have raised concerns about threats to democracy
because of their potential to distort election outcomes: (a) data-driven voter research
enabling political microtargeting, and (b) growing news consumption via social me-
dia and news aggregators that obfuscate the origin of news items, leading to voters’
unawareness about a news sender’s identity. We provide a theoretical framework in
which we can analyze the effects that microtargeting by political interest groups and
unawareness have on election outcomes in comparison to “conventional” news report-
ing. We show which voter groups suffer from which technological development, (a) or
(b). While both microtargeting and unawareness have negative effects on voter welfare,
we show that only unawareness can flip an election. Our model framework allows the
theory-based discussion of policy proposals, such as to ban microtargeting or to require
news platforms to signal the political orientation of a news item’s originator.
Keywords: disinformation, interest groups, news platforms, microtargeting, voter aware-
ness.
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1 Introduction
Democracy comes with many virtues. Among them are binding constraints on the power
of government and respect for individual rights (Olson, 2000). The main tool to hold gov-
ernments accountable in representative democracies are elections. Election outcomes that
express the will of the voters depend, in turn, on the information that voters have about
politically relevant events and people. Information is required for a population to form opin-
ions about policy issues, to critically evaluate its leaders, and more generally, to secure its
well-being through its own agency (Penn, 2016). The level and credibility of information
voters have access to affects their trust in political leaders, institutions, election outcomes,
and, hence, in the functioning of democracy itself (Almond and Verba (1963), Van der Meer
(2017)). As a principal source of political information, the media is of critical importance to
(democratic) societies.
However, recent developments regarding the information available about voters, means
to provide information to voters, and the nature of information acquisition by voters have
raised concerns about threats to democracy because of their alleged potential to distort
election outcomes. These developments concern (a) data-driven voter research and the pos-
sibility of political microtargeting, and (b) news consumption of growing numbers of people
using social media and news aggregators that obfuscate the origin of news, leading to voter
unawareness about the news sender’s identity. We comment on these developments in turn.
Platforms collect vast amounts of data on users’ preferences and characteristics by track-
ing them on and outside of the platform and by acquiring third-party data.1 They can infer
a range of attributes from these data, most notably users’ political views (Kosinski, Stillwell,
and Graepel, 2013). Some platforms also offer microtargeted advertising services, which can
be used by political interest groups to tailor news to preferences and characteristics of in-
dividual voters. Microtargeting allows interest groups (or advertisers) to differentiate their
news reports, which may contain disinformation, to influence voters’ beliefs in their favor in
each subgroup of the electorate.2
Today algorithm-driven platforms such as social media, search engines, and news aggre-
gators are major players in the media landscape. More than half of digital news consumers
1For example, Facebook has access to data provided by users on the platform, data collected by tracking
users’ browsing behavior, and third-party data coming from data brokers (https://www.nytimes.com/in
teractive/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-sells-ads-life-details.html).
2Facebook’s Custom Audience is a prominent example of a microtargeted advertising service. According
to investigative journalism outlet ProPublica, Facebook offers a list of 29,000 user categories that ad buyers
can use to determine their target audience (https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-doesnt
-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-them). Microtargeted advertising services were used
in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/business/facebook-pol
itical-ads.html) as well as in elections in several other countries (Great Britain. Parliament. House of
Commons. Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2018).
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use an algorithm-driven platform as their main way to obtain news (Newman et al., 2019).
Platforms expose users to a wide range of outlets and interest groups that differ in their
ideologies and reliability of their news items (Newman et al., 2017). Users of news platforms
may find it difficult to distinguish among news senders, which, arguably, leads to voters’
unawareness of a sender’s identity. Indeed, platform users demonstrate a lack of recognition
of outlet identity and are less able to attribute news items to the outlets that reported them
if they saw the news on a platform than if they accessed it directly (Kalogeropoulos and
Newman, 2017).3 We incorporate these findings in our model by studying a condition where
voters are not aware of the political position of the reporting interest group and are therefore
uncertain about its incentives to report accurately.
Ideally, all political news on platforms is accurate and balanced, enabling voters to make
well-informed voting decisions. In reality, however, a variety of actors spread untrustworthy
content on platforms with the aim of promoting their own political goals (Tucker et al.,
2018).4 Disinformation produced by highly partisan websites (Faris et al., 2017), false news
websites (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017), and foreign governments (Maréchal, 2017) has been
disseminated on news platforms.5 If the electorate is led astray by disinformation, it is not
clear that election outcomes reflect voters’ true preferences. This is already problematic per
se. But even more concerning, it calls into question the legitimacy of elections and, hence,
may undermine citizens’ trust in democracy.6
The threat to democracy by disinformation on news platforms became the subject of
heated debate in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Several political
commentators argued that voters’ exposure to false news on social media might have been
pivotal for the election outcome.7 Indeed, concerns about the spread of disinformation on
news platforms are not without foundation. False political news stories spread more quickly
3Kalogeropoulos and Newman (2017) report that, when a news item was accessed directly on the original
website, users’ recall rate of the originator’s identity in their study was 81%, as compared to 47% if the news
item was accessed via social media and to 37% if accessed via a search engine.
4We follow the definition of Tucker et al. (2018): “Disinformation [. . . ] is intended to be a broad category
describing the types of information that one could encounter online that could possibly lead to misperceptions
about the actual state of the world.” Thus, the concept is broader than blunt lies or “fake news.”
5One of the best known examples is the Russian “Internet Research Agency” (https://techcrunch.c
om/2019/04/18/mueller-report-ira-internet-research-agency/).
6According to the Pew Research Center, 64 percent of U.S. adults say fabricated news stories cause a
great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current issues and events (https://www.pewresearch.or
g/fact-tank/2017/10/04/key-trends-in-social-and-digital-news-media/) and 68 percent of U.S.
adults say false news undermines their confidence in the government (https://www.journalism.org/201
9/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/).
Moreover, 85 percent of respondents to the Eurobarometer on Fake News and Disinformation Online consider
the existence of ‘fake news’ as a problem for democracy (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market
/en/news/final-results-eurobarometer-fake-news-and-online-disinformation).




and widely than true news (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, 2018) and were read and believed by
many voters (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler, 2018).
Despite the widespread attention to disinformation, microtargeting, and potential user
unawareness on news platforms in public debate, the academic literature is arguably lag-
ging behind.8 According to our knowledge, there is only one empirical research paper that
shows a causal link from politically-motivated social media use in an election (the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election) to voting behavior (Liberini et al., 2018). Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge there is no political or economic theory about the influence of political interest
groups on voting behavior that captures the specificities of news platforms.9 We address
this gap in the literature and ask what role microtargeting technologies and voter unaware-
ness about the political position of a news sending interest group play for the potential to
manipulate elections.
One might argue that manipulation of rational voters is unlikely, as many voters are
aware of disinformation on news platforms, and few U.S. Americans report that they have
a high level of trust in social media as a place to get political news.10 Assuming rational
voters, is there (still) a problem? We study this case: Can rational voters’ ex-post beliefs
be affected by news they receive via news platforms from ideological interest groups, such
that voters make “wrong” voting decisions in equilibrium? If so, what is the bigger problem,
microtargeting or voters’ unawareness about interest groups’ political positions, and why?
We incorporate these two technological key features of today’s news platforms into
a game-theoretical model: platforms may (i) enable microtargeted matching of news to
users based on users’ preferences and characteristics and (ii) impede users’ awareness of
the original interest group that reports the news. Our model comprises two kinds of active
players, an interest group and voters. The latter consume news via a news platform that
disseminates political news to voters and voters can elect political parties. A binary state
of the world, which is drawn from a commonly known probability distribution, objectively
favors either a left-wing or a right-wing policy. On a classical left-right political spectrum,
nature determines the positions of one interest group and of two political parties (who
are committed to implement commonly known left- or right-wing policies, respectively, if
elected). The political position of the interest group and voting costs of each voter are
private information and drawn from commonly known distributions. The interest group can
8Lazer et al. (2018) discuss existing literature on ’fake news’, assess that much remains unknown, and
raise a number of unanswered questions about the impact of ’fake news’.
9We use the term interest group as reference to all ideologically motivated suppliers of political content,
that is, it includes traditional newspapers or TV channels but also the websites and social media accounts
of political organizations and individuals. News platforms include but are not limited to social media, news




send a message about the state of the world to voters who are uniformly distributed over the
political spectrum. The interest group knows the state of the world but voters do not. The
timing of actions is that, first, the interest group sends a message to voters about whether
the state of the world is either favoring a left- or a right-leaning policy. Voters receive the
message, update their beliefs about the state of the world, and then cast their vote for one
of the parties, or abstain. While voters maximize expressive utility from voting, the interest
group minimizes the weighted mismatch costs between its own preferred policy position and
the ones of the two parties, depending on the realized state of the world.
We consider four different games, which are determined by varying the two essential
features discussed above. First, the interest group must either send the same message to
all voters (public) or can let the message depend on individual voters’ ideological position
(microtargeting). Second, when updating beliefs, voters can either be aware or unaware of
the political position of the interest group.11
For each of the four games, we characterize the voter-welfare maximizing Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, i.e., the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the highest voter welfare. We show
that, depending on the game voters are in and on their ideological position, some voters and
interest groups always prefer the same party over the other one independent of the state of
the world (which we call “radicals”), whereas others change their party preferences in line
with the state of the world (called “moderates”). Because radical interest groups ignore
their information about the state of the world and always try to send messages that support
their preferred party, in games with awareness about the sender’s position all voters ignore
messages from radical groups. By contrast, we show that the messages sent by moderate
interest groups can be truthful in equilibrium: those groups have an incentive to inform
moderate voters truthfully as their goals are aligned. If moderate groups are constrained
by public news dissemination, they inevitably also inform radical voters about the truth.
However, with microtargeting that disciplining effect disappears and radical voters do not
receive valuable information about the state of the world anymore because all types of in-
terest groups have an incentive to manipulate their beliefs. Hence, radical voters rationally
ignore all news and suffer most from microtargeting.
By contrast, the switch from awareness to unawareness of voters about the ideological
position of the original news sender hurts in particular “moderate” voters. In equilibrium
these voters know that a moderate interest group would inform them correctly but a radical
interest group would always send them the same uninformative message. Thus, if moderate
11One of the core findings in the empirical literature on the political economy of the media is that voters
update their beliefs differently for different sources if they know about the political position of the infor-
mation sender (Prat and Strömberg, 2013). For instance, Chiang and Knight (2011) find that newspapers’
endorsements of presidential candidates have more influence on voting intentions if they are ideologically
surprising (e.g., endorsements of Republican candidates are more influential if they come from left-wing
newspapers than if they come from right-wing newspapers).
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voters are aware of the interest group’s position, they can either completely rely on the
message received or completely discard it. Without awareness, moderate voters have to
guess, which means that they will sometimes discard a truthful message from a moderate
interest group and sometimes believe an uninformative message sent by a radical interest
group. Both changes hurt the payoffs of moderate voters.
An additional feature of the model is that, while we only assume a binary message
space (either a left-wing or a right-wing policy is objectively best), in equilibrium interest
groups use it for two different purposes: to persuade moderate voters to vote in favor of
the interest group’s preferred party, and simultaneously to mobilize (demobilize) radical
voters who are in favor of (against) the group’s favorite party. Moreover, we show that,
next to (stable) radical and moderate voters, a third category of voters exists, which we
coin unstable moderate voters : they behave like radicals in games with unawareness but like
moderate voters in games with awareness of the news sender’s position.12
An important finding with policy implications is the voter-welfare ranking among our
games: the public game with voter awareness is ranked highest, whereas the microtargeting
game with voter unawareness is ranked lowest. The other two games occupy intermediate
ranks, depending on parameter values. Additionally, we show that voter unawareness is a
necessary condition for election flipping (to change the election winner). Microtargeting alone
(without also assuming voter unawareness) cannot distort election outcomes qualitatively.
These results allow the theory-based discussion of policy proposals.13 One proposal is
that news platforms could be compelled to implement technologies by which users can identify
a message’s original sender, which should help users to also infer the political position of
the sender of the message. In our model’s language, this provision would help to establish
awareness among voters and thereby decrease the risk of flipping election outcomes even in
the presence of microtargeting.14 Other policy proposals we discuss are to ban microtargeting
or to require a minimum numbers of receivers getting the same message.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature.
We describe the formal model and offer a discussion of important assumptions in Section
12Given that news platforms create more unawareness, this finding suggests that c.p. today more people
behave like radical voters, i.e., they do not update beliefs after receiving news, than 20 years ago.
13The question whether social media should be regulated is not top of the list, any longer. Instead, insights
into how and why to regulate are needed. In February 2020, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg was reported to
say that regulatory boundaries would give citizens “confidence” that tech giants were following a set of rules
agreed by everyone, and that users “don’t want private companies taking decisions on how to balance social
equities without a democratic process” (https://www.euronews.com/2020/02/15/zuckerberg-tells-e
urope-regulate-soon-or-authoritarian-china-will-set-the-rules-on-social).
14Note that Facebook recently implemented the following requirement in its Custom Audience service:
“In the drop-down menu of each ad, the “Why am I seeing this?” section will show people the source of the
information (advertiser or partner) [...]”, our emphasize. For details, see https://www.facebook.com/bus
iness/news/introducing-new-requirements-for-custom-audience-targeting. However, it remains
unclear how much this feature is used and to what extent it diminishes users’ unawareness.
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3. The model is analyzed in Section 4, where we provide a characterization of the voter-
welfare maximizing equilibria in each of the four games mentioned above and compare the
outcomes of the games. In Section 5, we study voter welfare, discuss conditions under which
an election can be flipped, and analyze competition among interest groups. In Section 6 we
interpret some stylized facts about the development of news dissemination technologies since
the 1990s through the lens of our model and bring it together with evidence about trust in
political institutions in the U.S. We then discuss various policy proposals before we conclude
in Section 7. All proofs of formal results are deferred to the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the effects on voting behavior of interest
groups’ information provision on news platforms. In this way, our paper contributes to the
literature on interest groups’ influence on policy outcomes through information transmission
to voters.15 Like us, Shapiro (2016) studies the effects of false claims made by interest groups
on voting behavior. Whereas we study direct communication from an interest group to
voters, Shapiro (2016) develops a theoretical model in which an interest group can only reach
voters through a journalist’s news coverage.16 In the model, two interest groups compete
to influence profit-maximizing journalist, who in turn provides information to a voter on an
unknown, binary, policy-relevant state. Each interest group represents one state and can
produce a claim that contradicts the truth. Both the interest groups and the journalist
are informed about the true state. Nevertheless, to avoid appearing captured by one of
the interest groups, the journalist has a reputational incentive for balanced reporting, even
when all available facts unambiguously point at the true state. Both Shapiro (2016) and our
paper find that disclosure of the information sender’s political position helps voters but the
reasoning behind our findings is different. In the framework of Shapiro (2016), disclosure
takes away the journalist’s reputational incentive to report an ambiguous news item when
facts are not in line with his predisposition. In our framework, voters benefit from disclosure
even though reputation plays no role.
Our paper also adds to theoretical research on supply-driven media bias and politi-
cal outcomes, in which media organizations may manipulate news content to advance the
ideological agenda of journalists (Baron, 2006), editors (Sobbrio, 2014), and media owners
15Most of the literature on interest group’s influence on policy outcomes studies direct lobbying of politi-
cians by interest groups. See Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Van Winden (2004) for a broad discussion
on the role of interest groups in the policy making process.
16Papers by Sobbrio (2011) and Petrova (2012) are other examples of theoretical studies on the influence
of interest groups on policy outcomes through their effect on media reporting by journalists. Sobbrio (2011)
considers policy-motivated media outlets, Petrova (2012) analyzes the link between advertising profitability
and media bias.
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(Anderson and McLaren, 2012), or yield to pressure from governments (Besley and Prat,
2006) and advertisers (Ellman and Germano, 2009). A typical supply-driven media bias
model contains a media outlet that commits to a (potentially biased) reporting strategy to
maximize a payoff function that captures both a profit motive and a political or commercial
motive.17 Our model differs from this framework in that we abstract from any potential profit
motive that an interest group might have and that the reporting strategy is unobservable to
voters.
Our paper adds to an emerging, and mostly empirical, literature on the political effects
of social media, reviewed by Zhuravskaya, Petrova, and Enikolopov (2020), Tucker et al.
(2018) and Martens et al. (2018). With our attention to microtargeted news dissemination,
we relate to Liberini et al. (2018), who study Facebook advertisement price variation for
different audiences and ask to what extent political campaigns during 2016 U.S. Presidential
elections used social media to microtarget voters.18 They find that the Republican campaign
used extensive Facebook ads and microtargeting. They also attempt to measure the effect
size, if any, on voters’ election behavior if they were heavily exposed to campaigning on
social media. Here they conclude that microtargeted ad campaigns had significant effect
on voting behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and only study of its
kind, which documents the role of social media for election results (both on inputs and
on outputs of manipulation attempts). Theoretical work on microtargeted advertising in
political campaigns includes Hoffmann, Inderst, and Ottaviani (2019), Boyer, Konrad, and
Roberson (2017), Schipper and Woo (2019), and Sharma and Wagman (2019). Whereas
these papers study targeted communication from political parties, we analyze reporting from
political interest groups with targeting capability. In our framework, voters cannot share
the news items they receive with other voters. Pogorelskiy and Shum (2019) develop and
experimentally test a theoretical model on news sharing in a network, media bias, and
voting behavior. In their model, voters with a partisan bias receive a (biased) signal about
a policy-relevant state, which they decide to share or not to share with other voters in their
polarized (consisting of like-minded voters) or complete (consisting of all voters) networks,
after which they make a voting decision. They find that media bias has a stronger effect on
voting behavior than clustering of voters by partisan biases. Relatedly, there also exists an
economic literature on (online) echo chambers (Levy and Razin, 2019), which result from the
choice of news consumers to cluster with like-minded others in combination with a number of
behavioral biases. In our model, voters do not choose their news source (the interest group).
Instead, we assume that voters are randomly matched to an interest group to capture the
gatekeeper role of the platform’s algorithm.19
17See Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Stone (2015) for a thorough survey on the theoretical media bias literature.
18Nickerson and Rogers (2014) review economic literature on targeted political advertising.
19Of course, news consumers ultimately decide what news they consume on a platform. However, the
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Lastly, our model builds on cheap talk models, in which a sender observes a payoff-
relevant state and sends a costless and non-verifiable message to an uninformed receiver,
who then chooses an action that determines the payoffs of both sender and receiver together
with the players’ respective types. Li and Madarász (2008) extend the canonical cheap talk
model by by making the type of the sender (her bias relative to the receiver) her private
information, which relates to our model with voter unawareness about interest groups’ ide-
ologies. The authors show that disclosure of the sender’s type always hurts communication
when the direction of the sender’s bias is uncertain. Without disclosure, the receiver will stay
closer to the recommendation of the sender because he does not know whether the message
is an understatement or exaggeration, which provides the sender an incentive to be more
precise in the recommendation than in case of disclosure. This mechanism does not apply
in our framework. Whereas Li and Madarász (2008) consider two sender types with state-
dependent preferences, we consider sender types with state-dependent preferences (moderate
interest groups) and state-independent preferences (radical interest groups) over voters’ ac-
tions. A sender with state-independent preferences never has an incentive for communication.
Hence, introducing uncertainty about the type of sender (as we do in our model with voter
unawareness) makes communication less instead of more informative in expectation. Far-
rell and Gibbons (1989) and Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) study cheap talk communication
with multiple audiences, which resembles news reporting in our microtargeting game.20 Like
them, we find that a restriction to send the same message to multiple audiences can discipline
the sender to transmit information to audiences that otherwise would receive uninformative
communication.
3 The Political News Game
We first describe the model setup before we discuss its key assumptions in subsection 3.2.
3.1 Model
The game features two kinds of players, an interest group and voters, who act in a world
in which a news platform disseminates political news from interest groups to the voters and
voters can elect political parties. There are two political parties, indexed by j ∈ {L,R}.
platform’s algorithm plays a major role in this decision. For instance, users of a search ranking are more
likely to select higher-ranked results than lower-ranked results (Epstein and Robertson, 2015).
20Battaglini and Makarov (2014) and Drugov et al. (2017) study cheap talk games with multiple audiences
in a laboratory experiment.
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Voters’ preferences and actions: It is common knowledge that party L and party R
are committed to implement policies xL and xR, respectively, if elected. These policies are
elements of a left-right political spectrum (more on this below) and are exogenously given.
Voters have preferences over policies and receive expressive utility from voting. Voters are
characterized by their position y on the left-right spectrum [−b, b], meaning that voter −b
has the most left-wing ideological position and voter b has the most right-wing ideological
position. Voter ideologies are uniformly distributed on [−b, b]. A voter’s ideal policy xv
depends on her ideological position y and the state of the world θ ∈ {−1, 1}, which, however,
voters cannot observe:
xv (y, θ) = y + θ. (1)
Hence, all voters prefer a relatively more left-wing policy if θ = −1 and a more right-
wing policy if θ = 1. Each voter chooses a voting action a ∈ {L,R, 0}, where a = L if she
votes for party L, a = R if she votes for party R, and a = 0 if she abstains from voting. A
voter’s utility from voting in the absence of voting costs is specified as follows:
U(a, y, θ) =
g − t (xa − xv (y, θ))
2 if a ∈ {L,R}
0 if a = 0.
(2)
The parameter g represents the direct psychological gain that a voter derives from
voting. The utility received from voting for party j is decreasing in the mismatch cost
t (xj − xv)2 that the voter incurs if her ideal policy differs from party j’s policy position.
Utility from abstaining is equal to 0. Each voter y incurs a cost of voting, cy ∈ [0, c̄], which
is independent of y and θ and is an i.i.d. draw from a uniform distribution with support
on [0, c̄]. Net voter utility is equal to U(a, y, θ) − cy if a ∈ {L,R} and 0 otherwise. Voter
welfare, which will be analyzed in Section 5.1, is defined as:
W (a, c, θ) =
∫ b
−b




Voters’ beliefs: Voters have common prior beliefs about the state of the world. We define
voters’ prior belief p = Pr(θ = −1), where 0 < p < 1. Before voting, voters receive via a
news platform a single cheap talk news item m ∈ {−1, 1} concerning the state of the world.
Denote by µ (m) = µ (θ = −1|m) the probability (posterior belief ) that a voter assigns to
the event θ = −1 after observing news item m. Denote by E [U (a, y, θ) |µ (m)] a voter’s
expected utility from voting if she has ideological position y and posterior belief µ (m).
Interest Group: There is a single ideologically motivated interest group that accurately
observes the state of the world and sends a news item about the state of the world θ. The
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interest group has ideological position z, which is drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on [−h, h] and is unobserved by voters. Similar to voters’ preferences, the ideal
policy position of the interest group, xn, is determined by its ideological position z and the
state of the world θ:
xn (z, θ) = z + θ. (4)
The interest group reports cheap talk news item m ∈ {−1, 1} and earns the payoff









denotes party L’s vote share, and (xL − xn (z, θ))2 is the interest group’s mismatch cost if
xn 6= xL. Analogous for party R.
Four Games: We study the interaction of two news dissemination technologies and two
awareness states of the voters about the ideological position of the interest group z, resulting
in four different games. We will first focus on the two games in which voters are aware and
then on the two games in which voters are unaware of z. In the public games, the interest
group is restricted to producing a single news item m ∈ {−1, 1} for the entire electorate.
In the microtargeting games, the interest group reports a news item my ∈ {−1, 1} for each
voter y. In all games, the interest group may misrepresent the true state of the world. Voters
have no way to learn about θ apart from observing m.
All aspects of the game (but not the realizations of θ, z, and cy) are common knowl-
edge. In particular, voters know the distribution of interest group ideologies and the news
dissemination technology that is in place.
Timing: The timing of a game is as follows:
Stage 0 Nature determines θ according to p, draws cy ∼ U [0, c̄] for each voter y, and draws
z ∼ U [−h, h] for the interest group. Each voter y privately learns cy and the interest
group learns z and observes θ.
Stage 1 The interest group chooses m ∈ {−1,1} in the public game and my ∈ {−1,1} for
each voter y in the microtargeting game.
Stage 2 Each voter y observes news item m if a public news dissemination technology is
in place and my if microtargeted news dissemination technology is available. Each
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voter updates belief µ, and chooses voting action a ∈ {L,R,0}. All payoffs are
realized.
Equilibrium Concept: Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE)
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Definition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game is a reporting strategy m∗
of an interest group, voting strategy a∗ of a voter, and a belief µ∗ that satisfy the following
conditions:
(1) For all m, the voter chooses the best voting action a∗, which is defined as:
a∗(y,m, cy) =

L if E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗] > max{E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ∗] , cy}
R if E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ∗] > max{E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗] , cy}
0 otherwise.
(7)
(2) Given (7), m∗ (z, θ) is the news reporting strategy that maximizes the payoff of an
interest group with ideology z.
(3) For all m, a voter updates her belief µ∗ using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
The games we analyze have multiple PBEs. Therefore, we focus on the Voter Welfare-
Maximizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (VWMPBE) (i.e., the equilibrium with the highest
voter welfare). As we will show for all games, this equilibrium coincides with the equilib-
rium in which most voters receive news that is informative to them.21 News reporting is
informative to a voter if there is a news item m that is reported with positive probability
on the equilibrium path such that µ (m) 6= p, i.e. voters’ beliefs about the state of the
world are actually influenced by the message. Since we only allow for binary news reports,
informativeness of news implies that µ (m = −1) 6= µ (m = 1). For the sake of simplicity, we
limit our attention to the VWMPBE in which µ∗ (m = −1) ≥ µ∗ (m = 1) for all voters and
ignore essentially equivalent equilibria that are formed by permuting the messages m = −1
and m = 1. Hence, we focus on cases where receiving the message m = −1 makes more
voters believe that the state of the world is actually θ = −1 than if they receive the message
m = 1 in equilibrium.
We make two assumptions regarding the equilibrium reporting strategy to eliminate
multiple equilibria in which voting behavior is the same. First, if news are uninformative
21The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the lowest voter welfare coincides with the babbling equilibrium,
in which news is uninformative to each voter. As in all cheap talk games, all our four games have babbling
equilibria. Voting actions and voter welfare are identical in the babbling equilibria of the four games.
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to a voter in equilibrium (i.e., if µ∗ (m = −1) = µ∗ (m = 1) = p) for any interest group
ideology z, we assume that the interest group randomizes between m = −1 and m = 1
with probability p. Second, if news are uninformative to a voter in equilibrium for ideology
z′ but not for all z ∈ [−h, h], we assume that the interest group with ideology z′ mimics
the equilibrium reporting behavior of the ideologically closest interest group for which news
reporting is informative.
Technical Assumptions: Finally, we make assumptions on parameter values and intro-
duce notation that will facilitate the equilibrium analysis.
According to (7), a voter chooses to vote for party j in equilibrium if both her incentive
compatibility constraint and her participation constraint are satisfied, i.e. if the voter prefers
voting for party j both over the other party and over abstaining. A voter with belief µ′ is




+ 2µ′ − 1, (8)
which solves the equality E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′] = E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ′].22 It is incentive com-
patible for a voter y with belief µ′ to vote for party L (party R) if she has a more left-wing
(right-wing) ideology than the indifferent voter :
y < ŷ{µ′} (ICL), (9)
and
y > ŷ{µ′} (ICR). (10)
The ideological position of the indifferent voter with belief µ′ ∈ [0, 1], denoted by ŷ{µ′},
is only well-defined if −b < ŷ{µ′} < b. To ensure this, we make:
Assumption 1: −b+ 1 < xL < xR < b− 1.
This implies that each party is preferred by at least some voters, regardless of the state
of the world.
A voter y with belief µ′ prefers voting for party j over abstaining if her participation
constraint is satisfied: That is, if
cy < E [U (a = j, y, θ) |µ′] (PCj). (11)
We assume that the direct psychological gain from voting for a party with the voter’s
22Note that there can be multiple indifferent voters, as posterior beliefs might differ across voters.
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ideal policy position outweighs the mismatch cost, for all y, but is lower than the maximal
voting cost, regardless of the voter’s belief and the locations of party platforms:
Assumption 2: 4tb2 < g < c̄.
Hence, ex ante each voter y with belief µ ∈ [0, 1] votes and abstains with positive proba-
bility, which makes sure our model is interesting. Since the voters’ costs of voting are indepen-
dently drawn from a uniform distribution, this assumption allows us to write the probability




with belief µ′ votes for party L as E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′]/c̄ .23




with belief µ′ votes for party R is given
by E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′]/c̄ . We use these expressions of the voting probabilities of individual
voters to state aggregate voting behavior in a concise manner. We denote the turnout for

















E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ′]
2bc̄
dydµ′, (13)
where µy indicates the belief of voter y.
24 The probability that a voter y turns out to vote
for party j is calculated for all possible voter beliefs, contributing only to total party turnout
if the considered belief equals the voter’s actual belief (i.e., if µy = µ
′). We can calculate





It follows from (5) that the interest group is indifferent between a vote cast for party L





which solves the equality (xL − xn)2 = (xR − xn)2. An interest group with ideological posi-
tion z favors party L if z ≤ ẑ (θ) and party R if z > ẑ (θ).25
23Note that E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′] has the minimum g − 4b2 > 0 (see (2) and Assumption 1) and the
maximum g; see equ. (2). Hence, 0 < E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′]/c̄ < 1 because of Assumption 2.
24Janssen and Teteryatnikova (2016, 2017) use a similar formulation but only allow for identical beliefs
of voters.
25As a tie-breaker, we assume that the indifferent interest group acts as if it favors party L.
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Lastly, we restrict the parameter h such that there is an, ex ante, positive probability
that the interest group favors each party L and R in both states of the world:
Assumption 3: −h+ 1 < xL < xR < h− 1.
3.2 Model Discussion
Voters’ utility: The probability that a single vote is decisive is low in large elections.
Hence, it is unlikely that rational voters will turn out to vote if they are solely interested in
the election outcome (Downs, 1957). Turning out to vote is not paradoxical if voters derive
direct expressive utility from voting.26
Interest group’s payoffs and information: As we assume the same structure of the
ideal policy position of voters (1) and interest groups (4), the latter can be thought of as
being managed by members of the electorate, thereby reflecting democracy. The weighted
mismatch cost of interest groups (5) captures that parties’ political influence is likely to
depend on their vote shares. For example, the number of seats held in parliament or the
amount of campaign contributions received might be proportional to a party’s vote share.
We assume that the interest group, having access to expert knowledge and resources, is
perfectly informed about the true state of the world.27
A single interest group: This assumption is a shortcut for assuming that there are
multiple interest groups each sending one piece of news but that the news platform only
forwards one randomly selected group’s message to all voters. We study the case of competing
messages received by a voter in Section 5.3.
Perfect rationality: We model perfectly rational voters, who understand the incentives
of interest groups to misreport news. This is a strong assumption as many human beings,
and hence voters, have cognitive limitations and imperfect foresight. However, the signifi-
cance of our results is strengthened if we can show that and how even rational voters can be
manipulated in equilibrium and make voting decisions that are against their own interests.
Then, voters with naive beliefs about political messages could be manipulated even easier
by demagogues. Alternatively, assume that only a share α ∈ (0, 1) of voters are rational
(Bayesian updaters) and that 1 − α voters do not update their beliefs. Then, if α is not
26Expressive voters are frequently modeled in political economics (e.g., Schuessler (2000) and Glaeser,
Ponzetto, and Shapiro (2005)). There is ample empirical support for the expressive voting theory (e.g., Pons
and Tricaud (2018)).
27We refer to Shapiro (2016) and Kartal and Tremewan (2018) for a more extensive discussion on the
justification for maintaining this assumption.
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correlated with y, our results hold for the rational voters and, hence, qualitatively for the
entire electorate. By contrast, if α and y were correlated, it would affect our results also qual-
itatively. However, we are not aware of conclusive evidence that left voters are significantly
more Bayesian than right voters, or vice versa.
Prior beliefs: We assume common prior beliefs for tractability. Alternatively, we could
replace the common prior belief p by an individual belief py for each voter y. Qualitatively,
our results would stay the same. Posterior beliefs µ(m) can differ across voters, which is a
crucial feature in our microtargeting games.
Compulsory voting: If voting were compulsory (i.e., if voters could not abstain), the
participation constraint (PCj) would not apply. However, endogenizing participation in
elections provides us with results and intuition about different reporting strategies of in-
terest groups when they maximize their preferred party’s vote share, for which either the
participation constraint or the incentive compatibility constraint of certain voter groups can
be targeted (see next section). Empirically, voting is only compulsory in 13% of all countries,
whereas it is not compulsory in 85% (in 2% there are no elections).28
Disinformation vs. fake news: We assume that all interest groups are only motivated
by political interests and not, for instance, by a preference for truth telling. In reality, some
interest groups may want to develop a reputation for truth telling but this is immaterial in
our non-repeated adverse selection model. Nevertheless, we will show that, depending on
the game we are analyzing, moderate interest groups still report truthfully in specific, clearly
delineated cases (but not for reputational reasons). By contrast, note that disinformation
is not the same as lying or spreading of “fake news.” For instance, an interest group may
convey an entirely different message by strategically choosing which events (that actually
occurred) it includes or excludes from its news reporting.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We will now analyze the four games described in the previous Section varying the commu-
nication technology the interest group has access to (public vs. microtargeting) and voters
knowledge about the political orientation of the interest group (awareness vs. unawareness).
In all four games, each voter y wants to vote for the party that is closest to her ideal
policy xv(y, θ), which depends on the state of the world θ. The difficulty of a voter’s decision,
which party to vote for (if voting is preferred over abstaining), arises because a voter does
28https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout/compulsory-voting.
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not know the state of the world θ. In forming a belief about θ, she has two inputs: the
prior belief p about the state of the world being θ = −1 (in which case a left-wing policy
is better and voting for party L is potentially preferred) and the message from the interest
group, m. On the one hand, the news item is potentially valuable to the voter because the
voter knows that the interest group has perfect knowledge about θ, and so the news item
received might contain information about θ. On the other hand, the voter also knows that
the interest group’s payoff increases if it can make the voter vote for the party that is closest
to the interest group’s ideological position. Therefore, our model captures a situation where
voters should be “suspicious” about the message sent by an interest group, which is due to
the information asymmetry between the group and voters about the state of the world (in all
games) and about the interest group’s ideological position (in the games with unawareness).
4.1 Public Game with Voter Awareness
In our first game, the voter knows the political position z of the interest group, which
prevents information asymmetry about the interest group’s objectives. However, the voter
does not know θ. The interest group, in turn, knows all aspects of the game apart from the
realization of an individual voter’s voting cost cy. This ignorance does not affect its decision,
though. Recall Definition 1 and the notation we introduced in (8) and (15). We show in the
Appendix that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. The following strategy profiles and beliefs constitute the voter welfare-
maximizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the public game with voter awareness:
a∗(y, cy,m, z) =

L if y < ŷ{µ∗(m,z)} and cy < E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗ (m, z)]




−1 if z ≤ ẑ (θ)1 if z > ẑ (θ) , (17)
µ∗ (m = −1, z) =
p if z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1)1 if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) ,
µ∗ (m = 1, z) =
p if z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1)0 if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) . (18)
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Figure 1: Location of the indifferent interest group conditional on the state of the world.
Intuitively, the decision rule (16) shows that a voter only votes for her preferred party
if the expected utility from voting exceeds her voting cost. An interest group with rather
left-wing (right-wing) ideology prefers voters to cast their vote for the left (right) party.
However, equation (15) establishes that “rather left-wing” depends on the state of the
world. This equation cuts the space of interest group ideologies (ranging from −h to h)
into three subspaces, as depicted in Figure 1. If interest group ideology z is “moderate,”
i.e. if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1), then it depends on the state of the world which party the
interest group favors. However, if interest group ideology is “radical,” i.e. if z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1)
or z > ẑ (θ = −1), then the interest group’s favorite party is state-independent.
As a next step, equation (17) shows that the interest group has no incentive to report a
message that would favor its non-preferred party. Therefore, it reports m = −1 if it favors
party L and m = 1 if it favors party R. This shows that (endogenously emerging) moderate
interest groups use their information about the state of the world when communicating to
voters, whereas radical interest groups do not but always report m = −1 (left-wing radical)
or m = 1 (right-wing radical), whether it is truthful, or not.
The rational voters in our game understand the interest group’s strategy. Therefore,
if the interest group’s ideology is moderate, voters assign a higher probability to θ = −1 if
they receive the message m = −1 rather than m = 1. Therefore, the indifferent voter is
located further to the right of the political spectrum for m = −1 than for m = 1. This is
captured analytically by (8) and visualized in Figure 2. This Figure also shows that, just as
interest groups, voters endogenously come in two variants in our model: “moderate” voters
with state-dependent party preferences (with ŷ{µ∗(m=1)} < y < ŷ{µ∗(m=−1)}) and “radical”
voters (with y outside of these bounds) whose party preferences do not depend on their
beliefs about θ.
As voters can observe z perfectly in this game, they can update their belief about the
state of the world conditional on z. Equation (18) shows that voters trust the messages of
moderate interest groups fully, whereas they refrain from updating their prior beliefs after
receiving news from a radical interest group.
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Figure 2: Location of the indifferent voter conditional on the public news item received.
4.2 Public Game with Voter Unawareness
In this game the interest group is still restricted to sending one uniform and public message
about the state of the world to all voters (e.g. because it does not have sufficient informa-
tion about the political position of individual voters) but where voters are unaware of the
political position of the sender of a message (e.g. because they have no information about
the owner/sponsor of a certain news agency or the author of a social media account).
Proposition 2. The following strategy profiles and beliefs constitute the voter welfare-
maximizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the public game with voter unawareness:
a∗(y, cy,m) =

L if y < ŷ{µ∗(m)} and cy < E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗ (m)]




−1 if z ≤ ẑ (θ)1 if z > ẑ (θ) , (20)
µ∗ (m = −1) = p (2 (h+ 1) + xL + xR)
2 (h+ 2p− 1) + xL + xR
,
µ∗ (m = 1) =
p (2 (h− 1)− xL − xR)
2 (h− 2p+ 1)− xL − xR
. (21)
Proposition 2 shows that the incentives of interest groups are similar to the public game
with voter awareness (20): moderate interest groups report truthfully, whereas radical groups
report their preferred message state independent. Voters’ best response to this reporting
strategy is therefore also unchanged (19). See Figures 1 and 2.
What differs now is that voters do not know whether the sender of the message is a
moderate or radical interest group. Therefore, voters have to form a belief, which depends
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on the relative shares of left-wing radical, right-wing radical, and moderate interest groups
(21). Consequently, they trust all news a bit—and hence news reporting is payoff-relevant for
all voters. This implies that, as compared to the public game with awareness, in equilibrium
some voters trust the disinformation of a radical interest group, whereas others will discount
the truthful information from a moderate interest group. On the positive side, the discipline
effect of the public news dissemination technology makes news from moderate interest groups
informative even to radical voters, a feature that changes once microtargeting is possible.
4.3 Microtargeting with Voter Unawareness
Now we study the situation where the news platform collects and distributes news to voters
who are unaware of an individual news source’s political position. The platform has a lot
of information about each voter and grants the possibility to interest groups to microtarget
the message to every voter’s individual characteristic (i.e., to her political position).29
Proposition 3. The following strategy profiles and beliefs constitute the voter welfare-




L if y < ŷ{µ∗(my)} and cy < E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗ (my)]




my = −1 for Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2
if z ≤ ẑ (θ)
my = −1 (or 1) with prob. p (or 1− p) for y ≤ Y U1 and y ≥ Y U2
my = 1 for Y
U
1 < y ≤ Y U2
if z > ẑ (θ),
my = −1 (or 1) with prob. p (or 1− p) for y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2
(23)
where Y U1 = min{xL, ŷ{µ1}} and Y U2 = max{xR, ŷ{µ2}},
29Whether the price for such targeting, e.g. for paid advertising, is > 0 or 0, is immaterial for this paper.
19
µ∗ (my = −1) =
µ2 =
p (2 (h+ 1) + xL + xR)
2 (h+ 2p− 1) + xL + xR
for Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2
p for y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 ,
µ∗ (my = 1) =
µ1 =
p (2 (h− 1)− xL − xR)
2 (h− 2p+ 1)− xL − xR
for Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2
p for y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 .
(24)
Proposition 3 shows that voters’ best voting action (22) has the same structure as in the
public games (see (16) and (19)). However, the structure of the interest group’s reporting
strategy differs: while in the public games messages depend only on a group’s own political
position z (see (17) and (20)), now they also depend on voter characteristics y (23).
Nevertheless, due to Assumption 3, the interest group is still more likely to favor party
L if θ = −1 than if θ = 1, as depicted in Figure 1. Therefore, moderate voters assign a
higher probability to θ = −1 if they receive the message my = −1 than if they receive my = 1
(24). Note that in this game, which voters are “moderate” or “radical” slightly differs from
the public games. Figure 3.(a) captures the case where xL > ŷ{µ1} and xR < ŷ{µ2}. Here,
voters with positions y ∈ [ŷ{µ1}, ŷ{µ2}] are moderate, i.e. they react to the message received
by updating beliefs. By contrast, Figure 3.(b) captures the case where xL ≤ ŷ{µ1} and
xR ≥ ŷ{µ2}. Here, voters with positions y ∈ [xL, xR] are “moderate.”
The news strategy (23) shows that moderate voters get truthful news from moderate
interest groups. Their problem is that they cannot identify a news sender’s type. Therefore,
just as in the public game with unawareness, moderate voters react to news a bit (where
the updating probability depends on the share of moderate vs. radical left and radical right
interest groups; see µ1 and µ2 in (24)). However, “radical” voters realize that interest groups
have an overwhelming incentive to disinform them in order to make them vote for the interest
group’s preferred party—and hence rationally ignore the content of all news.
Summarizing, we conclude that the disappearance of the disciplining effect of the public
news dissemination technology by allowing microtargeting makes radical voters dismiss all
incoming news. Moderate voters do take news into account when making voting decisions
to some extent, which makes news payoff-relevant to them.
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Figure 3: Location of the indifferent voter conditional on the microtargeted news item re-
ceived. (a) xL > ŷ{µ1} and xR < ŷ{µ2}. (b) xL ≤ ŷ{µ1} and xR ≥ ŷ{µ2}.
4.4 Microtargeting with Voter Awareness
As a final game, we analyze the case where, due to the platform’s knowledge about voters’
preferences and characteristics, the interest group can microtarget voters—but where voters
are aware of the political position z of the interest group.
Proposition 4. The following strategy profiles and belief constitute the voter welfare-maximizing
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the microtargeting game with voter awareness:
a∗(y, cy,my, z) =

L if y < ŷ{µ∗(my)} and cy < E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ∗ (my)]





my = −1 for Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2
if z ≤ ẑ (θ)
my ∈ {−1, 1} (with prob. p (or 1− p)) for y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2
my = 1 for Y
A
1 < y ≤ Y A2
if z > ẑ (θ),
my ∈ {−1, 1} (with prob. p (or 1− p)) for y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2
(26)
where Y A1 = min{xL, ŷ{µ=0}} and Y A2 = max{xR, ŷ{µ=1}},
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µ∗ (my = −1, z) =
1 if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) and Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2p otherwise,
µ∗ (my = 1, z) =
0 if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) and Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2p otherwise. (27)
Proposition 4 shows that the structure of the interest group’s reporting is similar to
Proposition 3; see equ. (26): a moderate interest group’s message to moderate voters contains
correct information but all messages to radical voters are not informative. What is different
in this game is that voters know who is sending the news they receive. Therefore, just as in
the public game with awareness (Proposition 1), voters rationally ignore messages by radical
groups and stick to their prior belief p; see equ. (27). By contrast, moderate voters know
that moderate interest groups tell the truth. Hence, they fully trust those messages.
4.5 The Persuasion, (De-)Mobilization, and Disciplining Effects
Based on Propositions 1 to 4, we identify several interesting mechanisms.
In the games with voters’ unawareness about z, all interest groups can influences voters.
Our analysis suggests two influence channels: one tries to affect the incentive-compatibility
constraint of voters, i.e., to persuade them to vote for the interest group’s preferred party
instead of the opponent. The other channel affects the participation constraint of voters,
i.e., to mobilize radicals that favor the interest group’s preferred party to participate in the
election or to demobilize radicals that favor the opponent by convincing them to abstain from
voting. Therefore, in both games with unawareness the interest group can have a persuasion
effect on moderate voters or a (de)mobilization effect on radical voters.30
The two effects are illustrated in Figure 4 for an interest group that favors party L in
a game in which ŷ{µ1} < xL < xR < ŷ{µ2}. In Figure 4, a “+” indicates a wanted effect
for the interest group, whereas a “−” indicates an unwanted side-effect of sending m = −1.
The interest group has the ability to persuade moderate voters (ŷ{µ1} < y < ŷ{µ2}) to favor
party L over party R in both the public game (panel 4a) and the microtargeting game (panel
4b). However, in the public game sending m = −1 has an unwanted side-effect on radical
voters.31 With microtargeting, this unwanted side-effect disappears because messages can
30Empirically, Liberini et al. (2018) show that the advertisement strategies employed in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential elections to (a) persuade swing voters to vote for candidate Trump and (b) to make Republican
voters vote, differed substantially. In our theory, these two different effects arise endogenously despite the
simple uni-dimensional message space, {−1, 1}.
31Specifically, sending m = −1 will demobilize radical left voters, who think that party L is not left
enough, and mobilize radical right voters for party R, who would otherwise abstain but, after receiving
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Figure 4: Influence on voting behavior by an interest group that favors party L.
be personalized to voter types.32
Moreover, Propositions 1 to 4 show that a moderate interest group has an incentive
to communicate truthfully to moderate voters because their voting preferences are aligned.
This is different w.r.t. radical voters. However, if the interest group can only send one
uniform message to all voters, there is a disciplining effect of the public news dissemination
technology, which makes moderate interest groups report truthful to all voters. As voters
understand this, they fully trust the message of a moderate interest group. By contrast,
a radical interest group has an incentive to always report the same news. Consequently, if
voters can identify a radical interest group, they ignore its message and do not update p.
On the voters’ side, studying the effects of awareness about the interest group’s position
z produces an additional interesting insight. As is illustrated in Figure 5, we can divide the
electorate into three groups that are affected differently by a change in their awareness of
the ideological position of the interest group. There, stable moderate voters (with ideological
position Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 ) and stable radical voters (y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2 ) are moderate or
radical, respectively, in all games.
The novel part refers to unstable moderate voters (Y A1 < y ≤ Y U1 and Y U2 < y ≤
Y A2 ), who are moderate in games with awareness but radical in games with unawareness.
33
Without awareness, they prefer a policy that is more extreme than the closest party’s policy
m = −1, believe that R is acceptable.
32In the example, the left-favoring interest group would send m = −1 to moderate voters and would like
to send m = 1 to all radicals. The latter, however, is no part of an equilibrium because voters could then
infer θ from my. Only a mixed strategy solves this dilemma; see equ. (23) and (26).
33Note that unstable moderate voters only exist if xL > y{µ=0} or xR < y{µ=1}.
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Figure 5: Overview Voter Groups.
position and they firmly prefer their favorite party over the opponent. However, their party-
preference changes if they receive convincing evidence that the state of the world is more
favorable to the other party: a news report from an identified, moderate interest group has
sufficient power of persuasion to them because it is truthful without a shadow of a doubt.34
5 Welfare, Election Flipping, and Competition
5.1 Welfare
A news report that is (partly) trusted serves two functions for voters. First, it informs them
whether it is worthwhile to turn out to vote, or not (cf., the (de)mobilization effect of news).
Second, it helps moderate voters to find out which party’s policy position is closest to their
ideal (cf., the persuasion effect of news). A higher degree of trustworthy news and a higher
number of voters receiving such news translate into higher total voter welfare (see Section
3.1). In the Appendix, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5. (Voter Welfare) In the voter welfare-maximizing equilibria of the four
games analyzed, voter welfare compares as follows:
(1) Total voter welfare is strictly higher in public games than in microtargeting games.
(2) Total voter welfare is strictly higher in games with awareness than in games with un-
awareness.
Proposition 5 yields the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. (Voters’ Ranking of Games)
Total voter welfare across the four games ranks as follows:
1. Public news with Awareness
34This result suggests an empirical hypothesis: if a polity is characterized by more and more unawareness
of voters about interest groups’ political positions, e.g. through the proliferation of social media in political
news reporting, we expect fewer moderate and more radical voters.
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2./3. Microtargeting with Awareness
2./3. Public news with Unawarenes
4. Microtargeting with Unawareness
The intuition of Corollary 1, which is a central result of this paper, is straightforward.
Because of Proposition 5, public news dissemination and awareness of the interest group’s
political position maximize voters’ welfare. Public news helps radical voters benefit from
the discipline effect, whereas awareness enables all voters to recognize if an interest group
is moderate (and hence trustworthy) or radical (and hence untrustworthy). On the flip-side,
voters fare worst under microtargeting and unawareness, where both of these effects do not
exist. The ranking of the two intermediate regimes depends on parameter realizations.
5.2 Flipping an Election with Disinformation
The analysis above has shown that manipulating a democratic election is possible, where
the extent depends on the dissemination technology and the type of asymmetric information
between interest groups and voters. A critical question is whether this effect could be large
enough to flip an election, i.e., to change the winner from party L to R, or vice versa.
Here, we only consider non-trivial elections in which the electorate wants to elect party
L if θ = −1 and party R if θ = 1. Formally, this restriction means that E [τL|µ = 1] >
E [τR|µ = 1] and E [τL|µ = 0] < E [τR|µ = 0], where E [τL|µ = 1] is the expected voter turnout
for party L given that voters are certain that θ = −1, after having received messages. In
Lemma A.2, we show that the restriction is met if the following assumption holds:
Assumption 4: −1 < xL + xR < 1.
This assumption implies that we only consider elections in which party’s policy positions
are close to symmetric or not too far away from each other.
An interest group successfully flips an election through disinformation if the winning
party would have lost the election (i) in the absence of news and (ii) if voters had complete
information about the state of the world. Formally:
Definition 1: There is election flipping due to disinformation if the following two conditions
hold:
(1) E [τL|p] > E [τR|p] and E [τL|m∗ (z, θ) , z] < E [τR|m∗ (z, θ) , z] if θ = −1.
(2) E [τL|p] < E [τR|p] and E [τL|m∗ (z, θ) , z] > E [τR|m∗ (z, θ) , z] if θ = 1.
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The degree to which election flipping is possible depends on (i) the probability that
voters are exposed to an interest group with an incentive to flip an election and (ii) the
ability of this interest group to actually flip an election.
Regarding (i), the ex-ante probability of exposure to a malevolent interest group is:
(1− p) xL + xR − 2 + 2h
4h
+ p
2h− xL − xR − 2
4h
. (28)
This term reflects that only a radical right interest group (with ideology z > ẑ (θ = −1))
would attempt to flip an election if θ = −1, and only a radical left interest group (with ide-
ology z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1)) has an incentive to flip an election outcome if θ = 1 ((15), Propositions
1-4). While the probability of exposure to a malevolent interest group is the same in all
games, the ability of an interest group to flip an election (ii) differs from game to game. We
construct a single measure, the election flipping potential, to compare an interest group’s
ability to influence the outcome of an election in its favor across the games.
Definition 2: The election flipping potential is defined as the maximum (minimum) prior
belief p̂ up to which a right-wing (left-wing) interest group can get party R (party L) elected.
We show in the Appendix that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6. (Election Flipping)
(1) With voter unawareness, an interest group’s election flipping potential is larger in the
microtargeting game than in the public game.
(2) Voter unawareness is a necessary condition for election flipping.
The key insight of Proposition 6 is part (2): as long as voters are aware of an interest
group’s political position, election flipping is impossible. This insight will be picked up in
Section 6.
5.3 Interest Group Competition
In this subsection, we assume that there are K ≥ 1 interest groups. Each interest group
k ∈ {1, ..., K} has an ideological position, zk, which is independently and identically drawn
from a uniform distribution with support on [−h, h]. Each voter receives K messages. We
denote by q the number of messages m = −1 and by s the number of messages m = 1 that
a voter receives. Hence, K = q + s. The remaining elements of the model, as described in
Section 3.1, are kept in place. We prove the following Proposition in the Appendix.
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Proposition 7. (Interest Group Competition) Interest group competition increases
voter welfare in all games.
In games with voter unawareness, posterior beliefs of (moderate) voters are as follows:
µ∗ (q, s) =
(xL + xR + 2h+ 2)
q (2h− 2− xL − xR)s p
(xL + xR + 2h+ 2)
q (2h− 2− xL − xR)s p+ (xL + xR + 2h− 2)q (2h+ 2− xL − xR)s (1− p)
(29)
Equation (29) contains a number of insights. First, it is increasing in q, decreasing in s
and concave in both q and s. This means that a marginal news report with the same message
still affects beliefs but does so at a decreasing rate. Second, conflicting messages do not cancel
each other out (meaning that voters’ posterior beliefs are not equal to their prior beliefs)
unless party positions are symmetric. For instance, suppose that h− xR/2h > xL + h/2h ,
meaning that there are more radical right interest groups than radical left interest groups.
Receiving a message m = −1 (which favors party L) is now more informative about the
true state than m = 1, which implies that a (moderate) voter weighs the former messages
more strongly than the latter. Third, (moderate) voters’ beliefs converge to the truth if K
increases.35 Fourth, the ratio of radical to moderate voters (weakly) decreases if K increases.
The intuition is the same as why there are (weakly) less radical voters in games with voter
awareness than games with voter unawareness. One news item might not be enough to
persuade voters to change their party preference. However, multiple news items with the
same message can.
In equations (18) and (27), we have shown that, in games with voter awareness, a single
news item from a moderate interest group is sufficient to resolve all uncertainty about the
state of the world for (moderate) voters. Hence, receiving an additional news item from a
moderate interest group has no added value for voters. However, the ex ante probability that
a voter is exposed to news from a moderate interest group increases if K rises. Therefore,
voters also benefit from interest group competition in games with voter awareness.
35For instance, consider a game with voter unawareness and parameter values p = 0.5, xL = −1, xR = 1
and h = 3. Suppose θ = −1. In expectation, a (moderate) voter holds belief E [µ (·) |K = 1] ≈ 0.56 if she
receives one message, E [µ (·) |K = 5] ≈ 0.76 if she receives five messages, and E [µ (·) |K = 25] ≈ 1 if she
receives 25 messages.
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6 Applying the Model Framework
6.1 News Technology and Trust in Political Institutions
For a long time, traditional media such as local newspapers and then TV channels were tech-
nologically restricted to send the same political message to all readers or viewers (voters).36
Because of the direct and repeated relationship between sender and receiver, which enabled
the interest group to develop a reputation for a certain political position, this situation can
be characterized by our public game with voter awareness.
Then, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the first news platforms, including search
engines, social media, and news aggregation services, came along (Newman et al., 2017). By
design these services could offer automated access to a large number of sources distributing
political news quickly. Simultaneously, platform users demonstrate a lack of recognition
of the resulting heterogeneity. Kalogeropoulos and Newman (2017) find that digital news
consumers are less able to attribute news items to the interest groups that originated them
if they saw the news on a platform than if they accessed it directly.37 However, at their
start news platforms did neither have the knowledge nor the experience or data analytics
tools to structurally exploit the mass of information about preferences and characteristics of
billions of users, which are necessary to identify individuals.38 Therefore, this state of news
dissemination technology is best characterized by our public game with voter unawareness.39
After some years—and certainly since the technological developments of machine learn-
ing and especially deep learning in the 2010s (e.g., LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton (2015))—news
platforms developed their superior abilities to exploit the gigantic data sets that users supply
them with every day by using their services. In turn, voters’ confusion about the precise
originator of a specific piece of news has not become smaller. Therefore, today’s situa-
tion features high information asymmetry between interest groups and voters. It may be
characterized by our microtargeting game with voter unawareness.
Survey data indicates that since the early 2000s voters feel less well informed about
political matters and trust the news they receive less than before, especially if received via
news platforms such as search engines and social media. The Pew Research Center found in
2017 that “Americans have low trust in information from social media. Just 5% of web-using
36Even if national interest groups may have sometimes had regional or even local versions of their content,
the latter could only be adjusted to the preferences of voters in that region on average and not to the highly
individualized characteristics that today’s major news platforms have access to.
37See the introduction for more details.
38For instance, only in 2001 Google realized that their users’ clicking behavior that is automatically saved
in search logs is a valuable source of information (Zuboff, 2019). Two years after this game-changing insight,
Google overtook Yahoo as the United States’ leading search engine (Argenton and Prüfer, 2012).
39Potentially, this model also applies to the proliferation of (cable/satellite) TV channels, where viewers
had little knowledge about the political orientation of a channel they were watching.
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U.S. adults have a lot of trust in the information they get from social media, nearly identical
to the 4% who said so in 2016. This level of trust is much lower than trust in national and
local news organizations, and in information coming from friends and family.”40 Citizens seem
to be especially concerned about “fake news” and political disinformation.”41 In parallel,
voters are worried about core national political institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and
the Government. Trust in both political institutions has decreased significantly since the
early 2000s.42 Interestingly though, despite the reported distrust, social media are vastly
used, also for news consumption while the shares of prime TV and print media users have
shrunk over the past years.43
Bringing both the evolution of political news dissemination technology and the media
consumption patterns and doubts of the U.S. citizenry together, the model framework in-
troduced and analyzed above can rationalize these joint developments. The key argument
is that technological progress over the past 25 years has enabled political interest groups to
disseminate their strategic messages about the state of the world at a more microtargeted
level. In parallel, the rise of news platforms has significantly advanced the unawareness of
voters about news’ originators, which reduces their ability to put news contents into per-
spective. As joint phenomena, both developments can rationalize that voters with moderate
political views discount the credibility of all news they see online (apart from a few highly
reputable media outlets with known political positions) and that voters with more radical
views even disregard all news when forming their beliefs about the state of the world. These
developments can have serious consequences for the future of democracy (see also Thomassen
(2015)). What, if anything, could be done about it?
6.2 Policy Proposals
Ban microtargeting: Our model suggests that, starting from a world with microtarget-
ing and unawareness, if it were possible to prohibit microtargeting (and go back to the
public game with unawareness), the informativeness of political news would increase and
the potential to manipulate elections by spreading disinformation would decrease due to the
disciplining effect of public news dissemination. This would benefit radical voters, who, in











However, the interest group’s (and the platform’s) payoff would shrink. Should micro-
targeting be banned, such a legal provision would be hard to enforce.44 Most important, the
positive effects of microtargeting would be ignored: As known for long in the advertisement
industry, some consumers like to see advertisements that fit their product tastes, while others
are skeptical, especially when they perceive advertisements to be obtrusive.45
In sum, there are good reasons to ban microtargeting but the case is difficult, hard to
enforce, and its net effects on welfare are ambiguous and require further research.
Require minimum numbers of receivers getting the same message: Compared to
banning microtargeting completely, it may be easier and more efficient to follow a proposal
of the UK’s House of Commons (2018). Their Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee
suggests “a minimum limit for the number of voters sent individual political messages [...] at
a national level” (paragraph 142). Consequently, voters could not be targeted individually
but interest groups would have to send a similar message at least to the minimum number
of voters set by that committee.
The problem with this proposal is illustrated by the interest group’s equilibrium strategy
in games with microtargeting, especially if it coincides with voter unawareness (Proposition
3). There, we show that even with our most limited message space of {−1, 1} it is possible to
manipulate an election. If the number of moderate and radical voters were equal, an interest
group could even make use of its full election flipping potential and still manipulate or even
flip an election. Customization of the message content at the individual level is not necessary
as long as every voter can be attributed to a certain group with homogeneous characteristics
and this group is not too small. Therefore, it would be possible to both comply with the
House of Commons’ proposal and to effectively deceive voters and manipulate an election.
Competition among interest groups: As shown in Section 5.3, increasing the number
of messages from various interest groups seen by a voter increases voter welfare and benefits
especially moderate voters. Therefore, our model supports efforts to increase (or, at least,
retain) media plurality and to keep competition for voters’ attention lively. However, our
model assumed that the messages received by a given voter would be a random draw from
all available messages, which ignores echo chamber effects and demand-driven media bias.
Moreover, we did not explicitly model voters’ limited attention span, which mitigates the
positive effects of seeing many messages in practice.
44A public authority (for instance, a data protection authority or a competition authority) would face the
enormous task to understand and regulate the algorithms used by news platforms, a highly complex task.
45See Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) for a discussion of this literature.
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Reestablishing awareness about interest group’s political position: What could
be more effective, is to reestablish awareness among voters about the political position of
the sender of a specific message. Thereby, from today’s situation we would move to the
microtargeting game with voter awareness (see Proposition 4). Especially moderate voters
would benefit from such a regime change: without awareness, they discount informative news
somewhat and do take uninformative news into account when forming opinions about the
state of the world. With awareness, however, they could distinguish clearly between sender
types: radical interest groups do not send informative news in equilibrium and can, hence, be
disregarded, whereas moderate interest groups report truthfully to moderate voters, which
makes their messages informative. According to our model, radical voters would not benefit
from a move to awareness alone as long as they can still be microtargeted. However, as our
results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 show, at the aggregate voter level reestablishing awareness
could substantially decrease voter disinformation and the risk of election manipulation.
The problem stemming from voters’ unawareness is closely associated with the rise
of news platforms, which source their distributed news from many different original news
providers and thereby lead to voters’ confusion or ignorance about the original source. A
straightforward measure to help re-establishing awareness would be to restrict (algorithmic)
news aggregation or the dissemination of political news via social media altogether. However,
such a drastic policy would simultaneously hurt many users of these services, which seem to
get benefits from news platforms.46
Therefore, a more practical proposal may not be to force news platforms to change their
business model or to ban them from microtargeting users but to compel them to implement
technologies by which users can easily recognize the identity of a specific message’s original
sender.47 This should help users/voters to assess the political position of a news item’s
originator, resembling our game with microtargeting and awareness.48 If this were possible,
voters could, with reasonable additional effort, update beliefs about the credibility of the
news received and make voting decisions that are more aligned with their own interest.49
46https://www.cjr.org/tow center/tech-innovations-local-news.php
47Whether this works best via small icons shown next to each message or by some other easy-to-understand
signaling system is subject to further research, probably involving psychology, political science, and computer
science. At a recent conference, Google’s chief economist, Hal Varian, speculated that reliable information
providers on social media might soon sign their messages by digital signatures (personal identifiers) to
establish credibility.
48For an example that moves in the direction of such a policy, see footnote 14.
49Another proposal is fact checking, where external organizations check the truthfulness and accuracy
of news items that interest groups have reported. This proposal suffers from several shortcomings. First,
false messages have higher circulation and are read more often than correct messages (Vosoughi, Roy, and
Aral, 2018), making it very hard to identify all disinformation quickly. Second, even if all disinformation
could be identified, it would be prohibitively costly to check every message with political content, given
the low cost to produce such messages, including those by automated bots. Third, it is very hard to
reach all receivers of disinformation. Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) found that fact-checks of false
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7 Conclusion
Two developments in dissemination technologies have crucially influenced citizens’ consump-
tion patterns of political news over the past decades. First, big data about billions of users’
preferences and characteristics and data analytics methods employing machine learning al-
gorithms have enabled news platforms to identify and to target ever smaller groups of users.
News platforms can—and often do as part of their business model—sell this microtargeted
access to third parties, including political interest groups. Second, voters using platforms for
various purposes, are swamped with messages, including many with political subject mat-
ters. This can lead to voters having difficulties associating the content of a specific message
with the original sender of this message, its political position and, hence, its likely intentions.
Our model framework has allowed us to isolate the effects of a switch from public news
dissemination to microtargeting, and from voters’ awareness about the political position of an
interest group to voters’ unawareness. We have shown that both microtargeting and voters’
unawareness hurt the degree of information of voters and their total welfare. Crucially, while
problems surrounding microtargeting have resulted in various policy proposals intending to
ban the technique in practice, we have shown that voters’ unawareness about an interest
group’s political position is more severe: microtargeting alone can help to manipulate an
election by a few percentage points but only unawareness can completely switch an election
(to change the winning party).
Our model generates some of its more worrying results despite the fact that we assume
perfectly rational voters without cognitive constraints. In practice, many voters are subject
to various biases and limitations, possibly aggravating the negative effects we point out.
Moreover, as we have identified the dangers stemming from news consumption on online
platforms, including social media, it is particularly concerning that social media consumption
is especially high among vulnerable groups.50 Informed by our theoretical analysis, we discuss
several policy proposals that could potentially mitigate the negative effects of microtargeting
and voter unawareness of the originators of news items.
Our findings point at the role of increasing media literacy (see JMLE.org). Informing
(prospective) voters about the mechanisms and possible intentions of news reporting can be
messages almost never reach their readers. Fourth, flagging fact-checked news items that contain false
information might have an ’implied truth effect’, meaning that unflagged disinformation might be seen as
more accurate by news consumers (Pennycook et al., 2020). Implicit evidence, that fact checking is extremely
difficult to implement, was given by Mark Zuckerberg, who claimed that Facebook removes one million fake
accounts every day and that a team of 35,000 employees works on reviewing potentially harmful content
https://www.euronews.com/2020/02/15/zuckerberg-tells-europe-regulate-soon-or-authoritari
an-china-will-set-the-rules-on-social.
50“Social media news use also increased to 69% in 2017 among those with less than a bachelor’s degree,
surpassing those with a college degree or higher (63%).” See https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/10/04/key-trends-in-social-and-digital-news-media/
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an important step to become more skeptical and less naive. However, since our model as-
sumes perfectly rational voters—and showed that they can still be manipulated—, increasing
media literacy is no substitute for the more promising policies we discussed above.
Our model relies on stylized assumptions. On the theoretical side, some authors have
argued that confirmation bias (Plous, 1993) is a relevant phenomenon among voters, which
might be included in our framework in future research. Similarly, deviations from the ran-
domized draws and uniform distribution of messages, especially on the news platform’s side
(platform bias) and on the voters’ side (endogenous news consumption) are promising di-
rections for the future.51 This requires further empirical work and tests to assess to which
extent these assumptions are acceptable simplifications of reality. Among the most press-
ing questions are: To which extent do people fall prey to disinformation about politically
relevant events depending on the information they have about interest group’s political po-
sition? To which extent can political interest groups actually make use of this weakness
and manipulate election outcomes? To get clean results, such empirical testing may first
be conducted employing experimental studies. Then, to verify the external validity of lab
results, they should be tested in the field. A lot of future work is waiting.
51Both characteristics were suggested by Piolatto and Schuett (2015).
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Before proving Proposition 1, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Party L’s vote share, νL, is increasing in µ (·) if all voters hold identical
beliefs.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We begin by showing that party L’s turnout, τL (a), increases in µ (·).




E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ′]
2bc̄
dy. (A.1)






















− 2µ′ + 1
)
− t (xL + b)2
bc̄
, (A.2)
which is strictly positive if the following inequality holds:




− 2µ′ + 1
)
+ t (xL + b)
2 . (A.3)
The right-hand side of (A.3) is maximized for
µ′ =
4− xR + xL
8
. (A.4)
Plugging (A.4) into (A.3) gives us
g > t+
t (xR − xL)2
8
+ t (xL + b)
2 , (A.5)
which always holds under Assumptions 1 and 2. Hence, τL (a) increases in µ (·) for any µ′.
We now show that party R’s turnout, τR (a), decreases in µ (·). Given that all voters






























− 2µ′ + 1
)
+ t (b− xR)2
bc̄
, (A.7)
which is strictly negative if the following holds:




− 2µ′ + 1
)
+ t (b− xR)2 . (A.8)
The right-hand side of (A.8) is maximized for
µ′ =
4 + xR − xL
8
. (A.9)
Plugging (A.9) into (A.8) gives us
g > t+
t (xR − xL)2
8
+ t (b− xR)2 , (A.10)
which always holds under Assumptions 1 and 2. Hence, τR (a) decreases in µ (·) for any µ′.
Since dνL (a)/dτL (a) > 0 and dνL (a)/dτR (a) < 0 (14), party L’s vote share νL (a) is




Proof of Proposition 1. Each voter maximizes her expected utility, given her belief µ (m),
by voting for party j ∈ {L,R} if ICj (see (9),(10)) and PCj (11) hold, and by abstaining
from voting otherwise (16). The interest group reports m = −1 if it favors party L and
m = 1 if it favors party R (see (15) and (20)). As depicted in Figure (1), it depends on
the state of the world which party the interest group favors if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1).
The group’s favorite party is state-independent if z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1). Hence,
following Bayes’ rule, voters have the posterior beliefs specified in (18). Conditional on the
interest group’s ideology being ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1), voters assign a higher probability
to θ = −1 if m = −1 than if m = 1. As a result, the indifferent voter is located further
to the right of the political spectrum for m = −1 than m = 1 (8), as can be seen from
Figure (2). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, νL (a) is increasing in ŷ (·) (Lemma (A.1)), which
implies that the interest group has no incentive to deviate from its reporting strategy if
ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1). We can construct voters’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs in such a
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way that µ (m = −1, z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1)) ≤ p and µ (m = 1, z > ẑ (θ = −1)) ≥ p, which provides
the interest group no incentive to deviate for z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) and z > ẑ (θ = −1). Since
µ∗ (m = −1) > µ∗ (m = 1) for ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1), news reporting is informative in
equilibrium. Thus, we can conclude that the game has an informative equilibrium in which
the interest group follows the reporting strategy stated in (17) and voters choose their best
voting actions and update their beliefs according to (16) and (18).
Restricting ourselves to equilibria in which µ∗ (m = −1) ≥ µ∗ (m = 1) for all voters, no
other informative equilibrium exists since an interest group with ideology ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤
ẑ (θ = −1) has an incentive to report m = −1 if θ = −1 and m = 1 if θ = 1 in any equilibrium
in which µ (m = −1, ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1)) > µ (m = 1, ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1)).
It then follows from Bayes’ rule that beliefs are as specified in (18). An equilibrium with
µ (m = −1, z) > µ (m = 1, z) for z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1) cannot exist, as it would
induce the interest group to report the same news item in both states, such that voters’
beliefs are inconsistent with the interest group’s reporting behavior.
What remains to be shown is that the informative equilibrium is also voter welfare-
maximizing. Since only one informative equilibrium exists, we need to show that voter welfare
is higher in this equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium (in which µ∗ (m = −1) =
µ∗ (m = 1) = p). The expected payoffs of a voter with ideology y are as follows in a babbling
equilibrium:





















if y > y{µ=p},
(A.12)
where the first term (outside the brackets) is the probability that voter y turns out to
vote, the second term is her expected utility from voting for party j ∈ {L,R}, and the third
term is her expected cost of voting, conditional on turning out to vote for party j.
We now look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the babbling
equilibrium to the informative equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we consider the case
that voter y receives message m = −1.
The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology y ≤ min{xL, ŷ{p}}:
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E [U (a = L, y, θ) |p]− E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
dcy
−E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
)
, (A.13)
which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) < U (a = L, y, θ = 1)
for y ≤ min{xL, ŷ{p}}.
The gain from news is as follows for a voter with ideology xL < y < ŷ{p}:













which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) > U (a = L, y, θ = 1)
for xL < y < ŷ{p}.
The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology ŷ{p} < y ≤ ŷ{µ2}:
E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
c̄
(





E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
dcy
)
− E [U (a = R, y, θ) |p]
c̄
(








which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) > U (a = R, y, θ = −1)
for ŷ{p} < y ≤ ŷ{µ2}.
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The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology ŷ{µ2} < y < xR:






E [U (a = R, y, θ) |p]− E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
dcy
−E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
)
, (A.16)
which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = R, y, θ = −1) < U (a = R, y, θ = 1)
for ŷ{µ2} < y < xR.
The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology y > max{xR, ŷ{µ2}}:














which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = R, y, θ = −1) > U (a = R, y, θ = 1)
for y > max{xR, ŷ{µ2}}.
Thus, we can conclude that the informative equilibrium we found is the voter welfare-
maximizing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. A voter’s best voting action (19) and the interest group’s reporting strategy (20) are
the same as in the public game with voter awareness (see (16) and (17)). Under Assumption
3, the interest group is more likely to favor party L if θ = −1 than if θ = 1, as is illustrated
in Figure 1. For this reason, voters assign a higher probability to θ = −1 if they receive
news item m = −1 instead of m = 1 (21). The ideological position of the indifferent voter
lies further to the right of the spectrum if m = −1 than if m = 1, which implies that party
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L gets a larger vote share if m = −1 ((8) and Lemma A.1). Since the interest group only
reports m = −1 if it favors party L (20), no interest group type has an incentive to deviate.
Thus, there is an equilibrium in which the interest group follows the strategy stated in (20)
and the voters choose their voting action and update their beliefs according to (19) and (21).
The equilibrium is informative since µ ∗ (m = −1) > p > µ ∗ (m = 1) for each voter.
Restricting ourselves to equilibria in which µ∗ (m = −1) ≥ µ∗ (m = 1) for all voters, no other
informative equilibrium exists. In any equilibrium in which
µ (m = −1, ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1)) > µ (m = 1, ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1)), an in-
terest group with ideology ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) has an incentive to report m = −1 if
θ = −1 and m = 1 if θ = 1. It then follows from Bayes’ rule that beliefs are as specified in
(18). An equilibrium with µ (m = 1, z) > µ (m = −1, z) for z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1)
cannot exist, as it would induce the interest group to report the same news item in both
states, such that voters’ beliefs are inconsistent with the interest group’s reporting behavior.
What remains to be shown is that the informative equilibrium is also voter welfare-
maximizing. Since only one informative equilibrium exists, we need to show that voter welfare
is higher in this equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium (in which µ∗ (m = −1) =
µ∗ (m = 1) = p). The expected payoffs of a voter y in the babbling equilibrium are given in
equ. (A.12). We now look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the
babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we consider
the case that voter y receives message m = −1. The gain for voter y is given in equations
(A.13)-(A.17). Since each voter y has a strictly positive gain, we can conclude that the
informative equilibrium we found is the voter welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For the same reasons as detailed in the proof of Proposition 1, voters’ best voting
action (22) is the same as in the public games (see (16) and (19)). Reacting to that strategy,
the interest group reports m = −1 if it favors party L and m = 1 if it favors party R to
voters with ideological position Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 (23), where
Y U1 = min{xL, ŷ{µ1}} (A.18)
and
Y U2 = max{xR, ŷ{µ2}}. (A.19)
Assumption 3 guarantees that the interest group is more likely to favor party L if θ = −1
than if θ = 1, as depicted in Figure 1. Hence, voters with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 assign
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a higher probability to θ = −1 if my = −1 than if my = 1 according to Bayes’ rule (24).
The interest group engages in state-independent reporting to voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1
or y > Y U2 (23), such that application of Bayes’ rule induces these voters to ignore news
(24). There is no incentive to deviate from its reporting behavior to voters with ideology
y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 because both news items evoke the same beliefs and, hence, the same
voting behavior among these voters. The interest group also cannot gain by changing its
reporting behavior to the rest of the electorate. For voters with ideology ŷ{µ1} < y < ŷ{µ2} it
is, respectively, incentive compatible to vote for party L if my = −1 and party R if my = 1
(see (8),(9),(10), (22)), as is depicted in Figure 3a. Thus, the interest group cannot increase
its expected payoff by deviating from its reporting behavior for this group of voters. If
xL < ŷ{µ1}, there are voters with ideology xL < y < ŷ{µ1}, for whom it is always incentive
compatible to vote for party L (see (8),(9),(24)), which is illustrated in Figure 3b. Their
PCL, however, is more likely to be satisfied for my = −1 than my = 1 ((2),(11),(24)). Since
the interest group only reports my = −1 for xL < y < ŷ{µ1} if party L is its favorite party and
my = 1 otherwise, the interest group cannot gain by changing its reporting behavior for these
voters. From figure 3b, we can also see that it is always incentive compatible for voters with
ideology ŷ{µ2} < y < xR to vote for party R. For this voter group, PCR is more likely to hold
for my = 1 than my = −1 ((2),(11),(24)). Hence, the interest group can also not improve
upon its reporting behavior to these voters, which is reporting my = −1 if it favors party L
and my = 1 if it favors party R (23). Therefore, the game has an informative equilibrium
in which players follow the strategies described in (22) and (23) and voters update beliefs
according to (24).
Restricting ourselves to equilibria in which µ∗ (my = −1) ≥ µ∗ (my = 1) for all voters, no
other informative equilibrium exists. In any equilibrium with µ∗ (my = −1) > µ∗ (my = 1)
for Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 , the interest group maximizes its expected payoff by reporting as described
in (23). It then follows from Bayes’ rule that beliefs of voters with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 are
determined according to (24). News cannot be informative to voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1
and y > Y U2 . If µ (my = −1) > µ (my = 1) for y ≤ Y U1 or y > Y U2 , the interest group would
have an incentive to report my = 1 if z ≤ ẑ (θ) and my = −1 if z > ẑ (θ). This implies that
voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 would be more likely to receive my = −1 if θ = 1
than if θ = −1, which makes the reporting behavior inconsistent with voters’ beliefs.
What remains to be shown is that the informative equilibrium is also voter welfare-
maximizing. Since only one informative equilibrium exists, we need to show that voter welfare
is higher in this equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium (in which µ∗ (m = −1) =
µ∗ (m = 1) = p). The expected payoffs of a voter y in the babbling equilibrium are given in
equ. (A.12). We now look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the
babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we consider
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the case that voter y receives message my = −1.
The gain for a voter with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 is given in equations (A.14)-(A.16)
and is (weakly) positive. A voter with ideology y ≤ Y U1 or y > Y U2 is exactly well-off with
and without news because news is uninformative to her (µ (my = −1) = µ (my = 1) = p for
y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 ).
Since each voter y has a (weakly) positive gain , we can conclude that the informative
equilibrium we found is the voter welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The best voting action (see (25)) remains unchanged, as compared to the previously
analyzed games (see (16), (19), and (22)). The interest group’s reporting strategy (26) is
the same as in the microtargeting game (23). Voters with ideology Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2 receive
state-dependent news if the interest group has ideology ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) and
state-independent news otherwise. Voters with ideology y ≤ Y A1 or y > Y A2 always receive
state-independent news. Thus, following Bayes’ rule, voters’ posterior beliefs are determined
according to (27).
To prove that the strategy profiles and beliefs in (25), (26), and (27) constitute an
equilibrium, we now need to show that the interest group has no incentive to deviate from
its reporting strategy.
For voters with ideology y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2 , the interest group always induces the same
posterior beliefs (27) regardless of the news it sends and, hence, has no incentive to deviate
from its reporting behavior to these voters (26). In the proof of Proposition 3, we established
that if voters with ideology Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2 assign a higher probability to θ = −1, the interest
group achieves a higher expected payoff for z ≤ z (θ) and a lower expected utility for
z > ẑ (θ). Thus, the interest group has no incentive to deviate from its reporting behavior if
ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) ((26) and (27)). If we construct voters’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs
such that µ (my = −1, z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1)) ≤ p and µ (my = 1, z > ẑ (θ = −1)) ≥ p, the interest
group also cannot gain from changing its equilibrium reporting behavior for z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1)
and z > ẑ (θ = −1). Hence, there is an informative equilibrium in which voters choose their
best voting actions based on (25) and update their beliefs according to (27), and in which
the interest group follows the strategy described in (26).
Restricting ourselves to equilibria in which µ∗ (my = −1) ≥ µ∗ (my = 1) for all voters, no
other informative equilibrium exists. In any equilibrium with µ∗ (my = −1) > µ∗ (my = 1)
for Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 , the interest group maximizes its expected payoff by reporting as described
in (26). It then follows from Bayes’ rule that beliefs of voters with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 are
determined according to (27). News cannot be informative to voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1
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and y > Y U2 . If µ (my = −1) > µ (my = 1) for y ≤ Y U1 or y > Y U2 , the interest group would
have an incentive to report my = 1 if z ≤ ẑ (θ) and my = −1 if z > ẑ (θ). This implies that
voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 would be more likely to receive my = −1 if θ = 1
than if θ = −1, which makes the reporting behavior inconsistent with voters’ beliefs.
What remains to be shown is that the informative equilibrium is also voter welfare-
maximizing. Since only one informative equilibrium exists, we need to show that voter welfare
is higher in this equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium (in which µ∗ (m = −1) =
µ∗ (m = 1) = p). The expected payoffs of a voter y in the babbling equilibrium are given in
equ. (A.12). We now look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the
babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we consider
the case that voter y receives message my = −1.
The gain for a voter with ideology Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2 is given in equations (A.14)-(A.16)
and is (weakly) positive. A voter with ideology y ≤ Y A1 or y > Y A2 is exactly well-off with
and without news because news is uninformative to her (µ (my = −1) = µ (my = 1) = p for
y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2 ).
Since each voter y has a (weakly) positive gain, we can conclude that the informative
equilibrium we found is the voter welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (1) Voters with ideology Y A1 < y ≤ Y A2 have exactly the same strictly positive payoff
gains moving from the babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium in the public game
with awareness and the microtargeting game with awareness (see Propositions 1 and 4 and
equations (A.12)-(A.17)). Voters with ideology y ≤ Y A1 and y > Y A2 , however, have strictly
positive payoff gains from moving the babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium
in the public game with awareness but are equally well-off in the babbling equilibrium and
the informative equilibrium in the microtargeting game with awareness (see Propositions 1
and 4 and equations (A.12)-(A.17)).
Similarly, voters with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 have exactly the same strictly positive
payoff gains moving from the babbling equilibrium to the informative equilibrium in the pub-
lic game with unawareness and the microtargeting game with unawareness (see Propositions
2 and 3 and equations (A.12), (A.14)-(A.16)). Voters with ideology y ≤ Y U1 and y > Y U2 ,
however, have strictly positive payoff gains from moving from the babbling equilibrium to
the informative equilibrium in the public game with unawareness but are equally well-off in
the babbling equilibrium and the informative equilibrium in the microtargeting game with
unawareness (see Propositions 2 and 3 and equations (A.12), (A.14)-(A.16)).
Thus, all voters have a weakly higher payoff and some voters have a strictly higher
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payoff in the public games than in the microtargeting games and, consequently, total welfare
is strictly higher in the public games than in the microtargeting games (3).
(2) Let us first look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the
public game with voter unawareness to the public game with voter awareness. Without loss
of generality, we consider the case that voter y receives message m = −1.
Consider first an interest group with ideology ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1). The gain for
voter y is given in equations (A.13)-(A.17), with the exception that we need to substitute p
by µ ∗ (m = −1) (21) and µ (m = −1) by µ = 1 (19).
Consider now an interest group with ideology z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1). The gain
is as follows for a voter with ideology y ≤ min{xL, ŷ{p}}, with µ (m = −1) given in (21):













which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) < U (a = L, y, θ = 1)
for y ≤ min{xL, ŷ{p}}.
The gain from news is as follows for a voter with ideology xL < y < ŷ{p}:






E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]− E [U (a = L, y) |p]
dcy
−E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
)
, (A.21)
which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) > U (a = L, y, θ = 1)
for xL < y < ŷ{p}.
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The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology ŷ{p} < y ≤ ŷ{µ2}:
E [U (a = R, y, θ) |p]
c̄
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E [U (a = R, y, θ) |p]
dcy
)
− E [U (a = L, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
c̄
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which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = L, y, θ = −1) > U (a = R, y, θ = −1)
for ŷ{p} < y ≤ ŷ{µ2}.
The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology ŷ{µ2} < y < xR:













which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = R, y, θ = −1) < U (a = R, y, θ = 1)
for ŷ{µ2} < y < xR.
The gain is as follows for a voter with ideology y > max{xR, ŷ{µ2}}:






E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]− E [U (a = R, y, θ) |p]
dcy
−E [U (a = R, y, θ) |µ (m = −1)]
)
, (A.24)
which is strictly positive because µ (m = −1) > p and U (a = R, y, θ = −1) > U (a = R, y, θ = 1)
for y > max{xR, ŷ{µ2}}.
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Thus, the gain is strictly positive for each voter y and any interest group ideology z and,
consequently, total voter welfare is strictly higher in the public game with voter awareness
than in the public game with voter unawareness (3).
Let us now look at the gain in expected payoffs for voter y from moving from the mi-
crotargeting game with voter unawareness to the microtargeting game with voter awareness.
Consider first stable moderate voters (with ideology Y U1 < y ≤ Y U2 ). For them, the gain
from awareness is exactly the same as in the public games (see above).
Consider now the unstable moderate voters (with ideology Y A1 < y ≤ Y U1 or Y U2 <
y ≤ Y A2 ). For them, the gain from awareness is given in equations (A.13) and (A.17), with
µ (m = −1) = 1 if ẑ (θ = 1) < z ≤ ẑ (θ = −1) (27). If z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) or z > ẑ (θ = −1), unsta-
ble moderate voters hold the same beliefs (equations (21) and (27)) and have, consequently,
the same payoffs in both microtargeting games.
Lastly, consider the stable radical voters (with ideology y ≤ Y A1 or y > Y A2 ). They hold
the same beliefs for any z (equations (21) and (27)) and are, hence, equally well-off in both
microtargeting games.
Thus, the gain from awareness in the microtargeting games is (weakly) positive for all
voters and strictly positive for some voters. Consequently, total voter welfare is strictly
higher in the microtargeting game with voter awareness than in the microtargeting game
with voter unawareness.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The welfare ranking follows directly from Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6
Lemma A.2. Under Assumption 4, (i) E [τL|µ = 1] > E [τR|µ = 1] and (ii) E [τR|µ = 0] >
E [τL|µ = 0].
Proof of Lemma A.2. (i) Using equations (2), (12), and (13), we find that E [τL|µ = 1] >
E [τR|µ = 1] if the following inequality holds:





(xL + b+ 1)
3 + (xR − b+ 1)3
]
> 0. (A.25)
The left-hand side of equation (A.25) is increasing in xL and xR under Assumptions 1
and 2. Hence, inequality (A.25) is the least likely to be fulfilled if we plug in the smallest
possible values of xL and xR that do not violate Assumption 1. This yields the following
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inequality:
8b3 + 24b > 12b2 + 16, (A.26)
which always holds under Assumption 1.
(ii) Using equations (2), (12), and (13), we find that E [τR|µ = 0] > E [τL|µ = 0] if the
following inequality holds:





(xR − b− 1)3 + (xL + b+ 1)3
]
> 0. (A.27)
The left-hand side of equation (A.27) is decreasing in xL and xR under Assumptions
1 and 2. Hence, inequality (A.27) is the least likely to be fulfilled if we plug in the largest
possible values of xL and xR that do not violate Assumption 1. This yields the following
inequality:
8b3 + 24b > 12b2 + 16, (A.28)
which always holds under Assumption 1.
We now consider Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. (1) Let us first consider the interest group’s election flipping po-
tential in the game with public communication and voter unawareness. Without loss of
generality, we assume that θ = −1.
Since τL − τR increases in µ (Lemma A.1), Assumption 4 implies that there is a belief
µ̂ (g, t, xL, xR, b) for which turnout for party L is equal to turnout for party R. Using (12)
and (13) and plugging in µ̂ (g, t, xL, xR, b) for µ



















µ̂ (·) = (A.29)
g
4t
(2− xL − xR) + (xR − b− 1)3 − (xL + b− 1)3 .
Given that θ = −1, an interest group would only have an incentive to manipulate an election
by reporting m = 1 if z > ẑ (θ = −1) ((5), (15) and (20)). An attempt to flip an election
is successful if µ̂ (·) < µ (m = 1) < p. Using µ∗ (m = 1) (21), setting it equal to µ̂ (·) and
solving for p̂PU , we find that the interest group’s election flipping potential is:
p̂PU = min{ (2 (h+ 1)− xL − xR) µ̂ (·)
2 (h+ 2µ̂ (·)− 1)− xL − xR
, 1}, (A.30)
which is strictly greater than µ̂ (·) under Assumption 3. Hence, there is a range of prior
beliefs p ∈
(
µ̂ (·) , p̂PU
)
for which the interest group can flip the election outcome with
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disinformation in the game with public communication and voter unawareness.
We now set out to show that p̂MU ≥ p̂PU . For now, we suppose that p̂PU < 1. Using













Given that p̂PU < 1, the following equality holds by definition:
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Using Lemma A.2, we find that the following inequalities hold for any p:
E
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Hence, it follows from (A.33) and (A.34) that this inequality holds:
E
[








which implies that p̂MU > p̂PU if p̂PU < 1
If, instead, p̂PU = 1, it must be that p̂PU = p̂MU = 1, as p̂PU and p̂MU cannot be greater
than 1.
(2) Given Assumption 4, only an interest group with ideology z > ẑ (θ = −1) or
z ≤ ẑ (θ = 1) might have an incentive to flip an election (see (5) and (15)). With voter
unawareness, voters hold on to their prior belief p when they receive news from this interest
group type (Propositions 1 and 4). Hence, following Definition 1, election flipping cannot
occur.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider first the VWMPBE of the public game with voter unawareness. Using (20)
and applying Bayes’ rule, voters’ posterior belief is given in equ. (29). Since (29) increases
in q (the number of messages m = −1) and decreases in s (the number of messages m = 1),
an interest group has no incentive to deviate from its reporting behavior, regardless of the
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number of other interest groups. Using (7), a voter maximizes her expected utility by voting
for party j if cy < E [U (a = j, y, θ) |µ∗ (·)], where µ∗ (·) is formed by Bayesian updating.
Hence, a voter only maximizes her expected utility if she has the posterior belief given in
(29), which is the result of Bayesian updating and which takes all news items into account.
It then follows that voter welfare increases with interest group competition (3).
The proof for the microtargeting game with voter unawareness is the same, with the
exception that only moderate voters receive informative news and experience an increase in
the expected payoff from voting due to interest group competition.
In the proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 4, we have established that (moderate)
voters only have a higher payoff in the informative equilibrium than in the babbling equilib-
rium if they face a moderate interest group. Using (15), we find that the expected number
of moderate interest groups that a voter encounters is equal to K/h , which is increasing
in K. Thus, all voters have a (weakly) higher payoff due to interest group competition in
games with voter awareness. It then follows that voter welfare increases with interest group
competition (3).
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